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Mainstream research on boards of directors has been focusing on a direct relationship between 
board characteristics and firm performance, but up till now the results are inconclusive. 
Different reasons are put forward to explain this inconsistency, but it can be argued that 
‘traditional’ board research has been neglecting potential intervening variables. In this paper 
we present a process-oriented model for board effectiveness by relying on the corporate 
governance literature and the literature on group effectiveness. We follow the input-process-
output approach to extract the significant variables from literature and integrate them into a 
research framework for studying board effectiveness. In particular, we identify three 
intervening variables (cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms) which we believe mediate the 
effects of board characteristics on board performance. The rationale for including these 
‘process’ variables is the belief that the interactions and relationships among board members 
determine to a large extent the collective outcomes of the board of directors. In this respect, 
the model goes beyond the traditional structural attributes of boards of directors to include 
behavioural or attitudinal measures of board effectiveness. It also highlights the need for a 





Since the mid-1980s, the issue of corporate governance has attracted a great deal of 
attention both in academic research and in practice. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define 
corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (p.737). John and Senbet (1998) propose 
the more comprehensive definition that “corporate governance deals with mechanisms by 
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management 
such that their interests are protected” (p.372). Since corporate governance has to do with 
setting priorities, delegating power and organizing accountability, it receives high priority on 
the agenda of policymakers, institutional investors, companies and academics. Recent 
American and European corporate scandals (Enron, WorldCom, Ahold etc.) set off a fresh 
round of debate. In the wake of these corporate failures, basic principles and rules are being 
reviewed and strengthened in order to reinstall investor confidence. At the heart of these 
corporate governance reforms is the common interest in the effectiveness of the boards of 
directors. This comes as no surprise as Williamson (1985) argued  “the board of directors 
should be regarded primarily as a governance structure safeguard between the firm and 
owners of equity capital” (p.298). Corporate governance codes, experts and activists have 
long advocated changes in the board structure. The changes include, among others, the 
appointment of independent directors, the installation of board committees in those areas 
where conflicts of interest might appear and a separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of 
the board (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). These structural measures are assumed to 
be important means to enhance the power of the board, protect shareholders’ interest and 
hence increase shareholder wealth (Becht et. al., 2002; Westphal, 1998).  
The same issues have also received substantial interest in academic research. Boards 
of directors have been the subject of extensive research in diverse disciplines as finance, 
economics, management and sociology. Probably one of the most widely discussed issues 
concerns how to appropriately structure the board of directors and to what extent changes in 
the make up of the board influence performance outcomes. An impressive amount of 
empirical research has examined the consequences of different board characteristics, such as 
board size (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Yermack, 1996; Provan, 1980), outsider/insider 
proportion (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Kesner, 1987; Baysinger and Butler, 1985) and CEO 





But up to date, mainstream research has failed to reveal a consistent direct relationship 
between board structure and performance outcomes (Coles et.al., 2001; Dalton et.al., 1998).  
There seems to be a point of agreement in literature that progress in the field will 
largely depend on a better understanding of the inner workings of a board of directors 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000; Pettigrew, 1992). Already a small number of empirical 
studies offer a worthy attempt to open-up the “black box” of actual board conduct by 
exploring the dynamics of power and influence as well as the behaviour of board members 
and their relationship with management (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Huse 
and Schoning, 2004; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Parallel, some scholars have attempted to 
model the dynamics of boards theoretically (Huse, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). This paper links up with this 
research stream as such that it is also aimed at getting a more profound insight into the 
concept of board effectiveness by omitting a direct relationship between board characteristics 
and performance outcomes. Although the accents slightly differ, we share a common belief, 
i.e. that board effectiveness is determined by a large and interrelated set of variables which 
have been - to a large extent - ignored in mainstream board research.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate - from a conceptual point of view - the 
interrelationship between various criteria which are presumed to be important for the 
effectiveness of boards. In this respect, we will pay special attention to intangible aspects of 
board conduct. Guided by existing board models and complemented with additional literature 
from different disciplines, significant variables will be extracted and integrated into a 
theoretical framework. This paper unfolds along the following lines. We begin to explain, 
more in-depth, the inconclusive results found in board-performance links. Second, we briefly 
explain how board of directors differ from other teams1 in an organization. Understanding the 
uniqueness of boards is useful because it limits the extrapolation of constructs found in other 
literature, in particular regarding group dynamics. Third, we develop the research framework 
and, based on theoretical assumptions, we derive a number of propositions indicating 
relationships between the identified variables. We go on with a discussion of the limitations 
and boundary conditions of the model. The paper ends with our conclusions. 
 
                                                 
 
1
 It must be noted that the management literature has tended to use the term “team” while academic literature has 
tended to use the word “group”. 
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Explaining the inconclusive findings in board research 
Many explanations can be given for the lack of consistent findings in empirical 
research on the direct relationship between the board of directors and corporate performance. 
In essence, they all boil down to two issues. These are (i) a lack of clear construct definition, 
and (ii) the reliance on incomplete research models. 
First, the diverging findings have been attributed to the varying definitions and 
operationalizations of the constructs used in empirical research. Daily et.al. (1999), for 
example, identified over twenty separate ways of defining board composition. The earliest 
studies distinguished inside from outside directors and board composition was measured using 
three different approaches: (absolute) number of outsiders, industry inside-outside norm and 
outsider/insider proportion or dominance2 (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Later on, researchers 
increasingly wanted to capture the independence of the outside directors and have been 
separating independent directors from interdependent or affiliated directors, who are 
considered to be characterized by a lack of independence. In such an approach, board 
composition has been operationalized by the independent/interdependent distinction or by the 
proportion of affiliated directors (Dalton et.al., 1998). In addition to the complexity of 
uniformly defining board composition, the measurement of performance is also subject to 
considerable discussions (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Hawawini et.al., 2003). 
Although some scholars rely on market-based measures, research on boards of directors has 
been dominated by accounting measures  (Dalton et.al., 1998; Coles et.al., 2001). 
Performance measures rooted in financial accounting are being criticized because they (i) are 
subject to managerial manipulation, (ii) undervalue assets, (iii) are influenced by accounting 
standards such as depreciation policies, inventory valuation and treatment of certain revenue 
and expenditure items and (iv) are affected by differences in methods for consolidation of 
accounts (Chakravarthy, 1986). Furthermore, a review by Johnson et al. (1996) has revealed a 
list of distinct financial performance measures on which empirical research has relied, 
emphasizing the fact that certain measures have additionally been adjusted to account for 
industry effects or risk in a different manner. Consequently, the variety in definitions and 
measures applied in empirical research makes comparison of studies difficult and may cause 
the inconsistent findings. 
                                                 
 
2
 Proportion was calculated by dividing the number of outside or inside directors to board size. In contrast, “dominance” 
denoted the existence of a large majority of outside or inside directors on the boards, and was treated as a dichotomous 
variable (outsider versus insider-controlled) 
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Second, it can be argued that the models used to study the relationship between the 
board of directors and firm performances are incomplete. The literature on boards of directors 
is characterized by a near universal focus on studying the direct effects of board 
characteristics on performance outcomes while ignoring the influence of potential intervening 
variables. In particular, Pettigrew (1992) observed that in mainstream board research: “great 
inferential leaps are made from input variables such as board composition to output variables 
such as board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms which 
presumably link the inputs to the outputs” (p.171). More and more, researchers hold this point 
of view and are convinced that it is necessary to go beyond the traditional direct approach to 
fully understand what boards of directors actually do, how they work, and derivatively, to 
what extent they affect performance (Huse, 2005; Huse and Schoning 2004; Finkelstein and 
Mooney 2003; Daily et.al., 2003; Leblanc and Gillies 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). This 
criticism is however by no means limited to board research. It is also expressed in studies on 
demography-performance links in other contexts. In particular, in “upper echelons” research 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), scholars came to understand that the relationships between Top 
Management Team (TMT) demography and organisational outcomes are mediated and/or 
moderated by various intervening variables, such as team processes. In their recent review, 
Carpenter et.al. (2004) propose and challenge organizational researchers to “carefully explore 
the practical and theoretical meaning of TMT demographic characteristics vis-à-vis the deeper 
constructs they are presumed to proxy” (p.749). This actually reinforces the call of earlier 
authors to omit the use of direct input-output models. Priem et.al. (1999), for example, already 
pointed out that upper echelon theories frequently suggest mediating variables (such as group 
interaction processes etc.) to explain the influence of TMT heterogeneity on firm 
performance, but that these mediators typically remain unmeasured. “Most research 
undertaken from a demographics perspective implicitly views TMT processes as a “black 
box” that must be inferred because they are impractical to measure or cannot be directly 
observed” (p.947). The “black box” of organizational demography has also been described by 
Lawrence (1997) in terms of the phenomenon of ‘congruence assumption’. Based on Pfeffer’s 
(1983) original discussion, she noted that researchers assume demographic predictors to be 
congruent with subjective concepts, which therefore are irrelevant and unnecessary to include. 
She makes a strong case to eliminate the congruence assumption to study the actual 
mechanisms underlying the demography-outcome relationships.  
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At the same time, the need for inquiry into intervening processes is strengthened by 
studies that have demonstrated superior explanatory power by including process variables in 
TMT research (Petterson et al., 2003; Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Amazon and Sapienza 
,1997; Amazon 1996; Smith et. al.; 1994). In this respect, TMT research and research on 
group effectiveness in general, offer an interesting starting point to explore the added-value of 
including process variables in board research. Still, it can be argued that the board of directors 
differs from other organizational teams.  
 
Differentiating board of directors from other organizational teams 
The board of directors can be considered as a multi-member governing body, standing 
at the apex of the organization (Bainbridge, 2002). However, being a collection of individuals, 
boards of directors show some distinctive features which make them, to some extent, unique 
among organizational teams (see Appendix 1 for a summary). A first feature is partial 
affiliation. Board of directors usually include outside directors who are not employees of the 
company and do not assume management tasks. In most cases, outside directors sit on several 
boards and these mandates come on top of their regular ‘day job’. In this respect, outside 
board members are only partial affiliated to the company on whose board they serve (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Nadler et.al., 2006). Second, boards of directors are characterised by 
episodic interactions. Most board of directors only meet a few times a year. Although (some) 
board committees meet more frequently, the meetings involve only a small subset of the 
whole board. By consequence, board members spend only a limited time together in the 
boardroom so that it’s quite difficult to experience intense personal contact.  Besides, without 
little or no contact between formal board meetings, there is little opportunity to build strong 
working relationships (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Nadler et.al., 2006). A third feature is 
limited time and information. Outside board members devote only limited amount of their 
time on board-related work (Lorsh and MacIver, 1989). Moreover, they heavily dependent on 
the goodwill of management to obtain relevant and timely information. In this respect, it is 
obvious, that outside directors - compared to executive directors- are restricted in their ability 
to become deeply familiar with the company, its people and its business (Nadler et.al., 2006). 
Fourth, boards of directors are commonly composed of a preponderance of leaders.  
Regarding the background of outside directors, most of them can present a track-record as 
former or present CEO (Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  
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It is often because of their outstanding professional achievements that they have been 
appointed to the board of directors. At the same time, these individuals are used to sit at the 
head of the table and they have their own psychological needs for power, recognition, and 
influence. For many of these directors, the setting of a board of directors is (or might be) 
sensed as an unusual and uncomfortable situation (Nadler et.al., 2006). Fifth, there exist 
complex authority relationships within a board of directors. In contrast to management teams, 
the role and position of outside directors do not reflect their status in the company’s hierarchy 
(Nadler et.al., 2006). Still, some outside directors may have more authority than others, due 
their status in corporate world or the business community at large. Moreover, when the 
positions of chairman of the board and CEO are combined, a perplexing power relationship 
may exist. A sixth feature relates to the changing expectations of work. Compared to other 
teams, the role of the board is often not well-defined and can substantially differ among 
companies. In addition, boards of directors are increasingly confronted with unprecedented 
scrutiny and (public) pressure (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). As a result, many boards 
are struggling to agree on what their tasks are, also vis-à-vis management. Seventh, boards of 
directors expose an aura of formality.  The format, physical setting, social rituals and conduct 
of board meeting create a sense of formality and status which is uncommon among other 
teams (Nadler et.al., 2006). Finally, boards of directors encompass a larger number of 
members in comparison to the size of other organizational team (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
 
Presenting a process-oriented model for board effectiveness 
Taking into account these distinctive features, we develop a model of board 
effectiveness that bridges some of the gaps in the research on boards of directors (see Figure 
1). Drawing on a broad variety of sources (e.g. corporate governance literature, literature on 
TMT and group effectiveness, field studies etc.), we distinguish multiple intervening 
constructs that we believe mediate the direct impact of board characteristics on firm 
performance. The proposed model strongly relies on the input-process-output approach used 
in research frameworks for studying organizational teams (e.g. Gladstein, 1984; Cohen and 
Baily, 1997). Apart from that, this approach has also inspired other board models (e.g. Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005). 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
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Defining board effectiveness 
Literature reveals that there exist multiple approaches to determine the concept of 
effectiveness due to the scholars’ different background and their heterogeneous research 
purposes (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Kuo, 2004). In their seminal article Hackman 
and Morris (1975) set out three criteria of group effectiveness: group performance, the ability 
of the group to work together over time and the satisfaction of the personal needs of group 
members. This definition includes the classic “task” (group-produced) and “maintenance” 
(attitudinal) criteria and are commonly used in research on work groups (Gladstein, 1984; 
Jehn, 1995; Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Lemieux-Charles et. al., 2002). Applied to the context of 
boards of directors, board effectiveness is mainly concerned with “task” outcomes and occurs 
by fulfilling a role set (Nicholson and Kiel 2004). The latter is, however, still subject to 
considerable debate in literature. The role set is often not defined as an integrated set of 
activities. In contrast, based on diverging theoretical assumptions, the role of the board is 
conceptionalized in a multiple, and in some cases contradictory, way (Johnson et.al., 1996; 
Hung, 1998). Commonly accepted and used is the classification into three broadly defined 
roles: control, service and strategic role (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Maassen 1999). 
Regarding the control role, the board of directors has a legal duty to provide oversight 
and is expected to carry out this duty with sufficient loyalty and care. Particularly, in Anglo-
American countries it is emphasised that the board has a fiduciary duty to oversee the 
company’s operations and monitor top management performance in order to protect 
shareholders’ interests (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). The board’s duty to monitor management 
and corporate performance has also been addressed in other disciplines than law. In particular, 
the dominant theory underlying the control role of the board is agency theory, initially the 
prevailing school of thought in finance and economic research This theory is concerned with 
resolving problems that may occur in the relationship between two major parties, the principal 
(owner) and agent (the manager) (Eisenhardt, 1989).  First identified by Adam Smith (1776) 
in his commentary on joint stock companies and further elaborated in the twentieth century by 
the influential work of Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency 
problems stem from the separation of ownership and control. The latter leads to a decision 
process in which “the decision managers who initiate and implement important decisions are 
not the major residual claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects 
of their decisions” (Fama and Jensen 1983:5).  
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Agency theorists believe that managers (agents) may pursue opportunistic behaviour 
which may be in conflict with the goals of the owners (principals) and hence destroy 
shareholder wealth. Advocates of the agency approach see the board of directors as “an 
economic institution that helps to solve the agency problems inherent in managing any 
organization” (Hermalin  and Weisbach 2000:1). Put differently, the board of directors is one 
of the internal control mechanisms designed to address the conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders and to bring their interests into congruence (Walsh and Seward, 
1990). Within this context, a board of directors is the guardian of shareholders’ welfare and 
fulfil the critical tasks of hiring, firing and compensating the CEO (top management) and to 
ratify and monitor important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
The service role of the board of directors primarily stems from a resource dependence 
view and - in second order - from stewardship theory. A careful reading of the literature 
however reveals that the service role of the board is not uniformly approached. From a 
resource dependence perspective, which is mainly grounded in sociology and organizational 
theory, the board of directors is seen “as a vehicle for co-opting important external 
organizations with which the company is interdependent” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Within this context, Mintzberg (1983) distinguishes at least four service roles of the board of 
directors: (1) co-opting external influencers, (2) establishing contacts (and raising funds) for 
the organization, (3) enhancing the organization’s reputation and (4) giving advice and 
counsel to the organization. In particular, the latter refers to the board’s potential to provide 
high-level advice to the CEO (Jensen, 1993; Dalton et.al., 1998). However, an alternative 
approach of the service role, mainly based on stewardship theory, excludes legitimacy and 
resource dependence functions in favour of strategic engagement. According to stewardship 
theory, managers are good stewards of the company assets. Managers do not misappropriate 
corporate resources at any price because they have a range of non-financial motives, such as 
the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, the need for achievement and recognition 
etc.. Given the absence of self-interested behaviour by managers, the issue becomes to what 
extent organizational structure facilitates the aspiration of management for high performance 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). As opposed to agency theory, 
stewardship theory represents a consensus perspective and rejects the notion that the board is 
a disciplining mechanism to align conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. In 
fact, proponents of the stewardship school of thought see the board of directors as an 
important strategic device.  
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They suggests that the board of directors can serve the CEO and management with 
their expertise through their active involvement in the strategic decision-making process, 
particularly by advising top management on the initiation, formulation and implementation of 
strategy (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; see also the review by Johnson et.al., 1996). By 
consequence this approach blurs a clear distinction between the service and the strategic role 
of a board of directors. 
Finally, the strategic role of the board of directors has historically been subject to 
much dispute, especially in the management literature (see e.g. the discussions in various 
issues of Harvard Business Review from the beginning of the 1980, edited by Kenneth 
Andrews). The strategic role of the board taps insights from different theoretical perspectives. 
In essence, two broad schools of thought on the involvement of boards in strategy can be 
detected, referred to in the literature as “active” and “passive” (Golden and Zajac, 2001). The 
passive school views the board of directors as a rubber stamp or a tool of management with 
little or no impact on a company’s strategy process. In contrast, the active school views the 
board of directors as an ‘independent’ body who actually contributes in shaping the strategic 
course of a company and in guiding the management to achieve corporate mission and 
objectives (Maassen, 1999; Hung, 1998). The board’s contribution can occurs in a myriad of 
ways such as through advice and counsel to the CEO, through careful refinements of strategic 
plans, by initiating own analyses or suggesting alternatives, by probing managerial 
assumptions about the firm and its environment, or by ensuring that agreement exists among 
executives on the strategic direction on the firm (Zahra, 1990; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
According to Goodstein et.al. (1990) the strategic role is of particular importance in critical 
cases such as periods of environmental turbulence or declines in company’s performance, 
because such events provide the opportunity to a board to initiate strategic change. As pointed 
out by different scholars, the active school of thought is receiving growing attention and is 
graining ground (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). An overview of 
the three board roles and the functions that make up each role is presented in Appendix 2. 
Although the literature recognizes three board roles, the importance attach to each role 
is not equal. As agency theory dominates corporate governance research, it is obvious that the 
board’s control role is emphasized as the most important one and this role is well-documented 
by a rich body of empirical literature. At the same time, the importance of the board’s 
strategic role is supported by a limited but increasing amount of empirical research.  
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Several scholars have attempted to understand actual board involvement in the 
strategic decision-making process mainly relying on qualitative research techniques (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Short et. al., 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Goodstein et.al., 
1994; Johnson et.al., 1993; Judge and Zeithalm, 1992; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989). Applied to this study, we value the view of a two-fold role set which 
comprises the control and the strategic role. Different arguments underpin our choice. First, 
previous studies on boards of directors have relied on a single theoretical perspective 
favouring one board role at the expense of the other, resulting in an incomplete picture 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In order to get a more holistic and richer understanding of what 
boards do, we contend that a multiple lens approach is important.  Second, as argued above, 
the service and strategy role are not mutually exclusive as there exists some overlap with 
respect to the prescribed tasks performed by the board, particularly regarding the strategic 
decision-making process. Finally, a recent study by Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) 
revealed that the strategy role was strongly emphasised (in comparison to the other board 
functions) in directors’ perceptions. Therefore, we have opted to integrate the service and the 
strategy role. By consequence, in our model board task performance refers to the degree 
boards are successful in carrying out their strategic and monitoring tasks. Because of the 
rather confidential nature of board activities, it is not easy to measure board task performance 
in ways that are both reliable and comprehensive. A suggestion of Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
is to use certain publicly announced board actions, for example CEO replacement, as proxies 
for performance of the control functions. Still, this approach appears to be less suitable for the 
assessment of board task performance on the strategic dimension. In particular, it can be 
argued that is difficult to isolate the real impact of the board of directors (from the impact of 
management) when assessing publicly announced strategic decisions, such as a take-over. 
Alternatively, we suggest researchers to measure board task performance by identifying 
various board functions related to the strategic and monitoring role and then asking 
respondents to assess how well these functions are being performed. In spite of their 
limitations, these self-evaluation approaches have been commonly used in previous empirical 
studies on board effectiveness in the non-profit sector (e.g. Cornforth, 2001; Green and 
Griesinger, 1996; Bradshaw et.al., 1992; Slesinger, 1991).  
So far, we have argued that the impact of boards of directors on company performance 
occurs indirect through the effectiveness of boards in performing two key roles.  
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In the next sections, we elaborate the indirect route by proposing three group process 
variables that will significantly influence the task performance of boards: cohesiveness, 
debate and conflict norms. Moreover, we capture them in a set of propositions. 
 
Cohesiveness and debate as intervening variables 
Despite of certain distinctive characteristics, boards of directors are, like top 
management teams, confronted with complex ambiguous tasks. Much of the work that boards 
of directors must do in order to produce effective outcomes involves cooperative decision-
making and joint efforts. Board members are required to work together by mutual interaction, 
sharing information, resources and decisions.  In this respect, the board of directors is 
considered to be a collegial body and only if board members coalesced into a group collective 
judgment can emerge (Charan, 1998). However, it is only the last decade that scholars began 
suggesting that the board should transform itself from a loose aggregation of individuals into 
an effective team (for example, Nadler, 2006 and 2004; Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Conger 
et.al., 2001). For boards of directors becoming a team, who operates collegial, we argue that a 
minimum degree of cohesion among the board members is required. Our view that cohesion 
aids collaboration and communication among board members, and as such influences 
performance outcomes, is also suggested and reinforced by research on other teams. 
Organizational demography literature has emphasised cohesiveness as a potential intervening 
construct and it is one of the most extensively studied variables in group settings 
(Bettenhausen, 1991; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Group cohesiveness is defined as “the 
degree to which the members of the group are attracted to each other and are motivated to 
stay in the group” (Shaw 1976:197). The concept is affective in nature and is characterised by 
a sense of connectedness. In particular, cohesiveness is considered to play a vital role in any 
exchange relationship (Austin, 1997) and it can be argued that it also has relevance in the 
context of boards of directors. To the extent board members like each other and like the 
group, they can be expected to interact and integrate more easily. Moreover, qualitative 
research on boards of directors (e.g. Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Finkelstein and 
Mooney (2003)) has revealed that directors value the chemistry of the board and the team 
spirit of their colleagues as important elements of board effectiveness. Ideas as “team spirit” 
and “teamwork” have been linked to the concept of cohesiveness (Seashore, 1977). Lastly, the 
board model put forward by Forbes and Milliken (1999) has also suggested that cohesiveness 
may exert an influence on the task performance of boards of directors.  
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Researchers can operationalize cohesiveness by using the four-item cohesiveness 
index from O’Reilly et.al. (1989). In addition, directors can be asked to evaluate statements 
such as “members of this board respect and trust each other”, “board members also socialize 
with each other outside board meetings” etc. 
Considering the board of directors as a decision-making group, we propose a  second 
intervening construct namely debate. Debate is defined -consistent with Simons et. al. (1999)- 
as an open discussion of task-related differences and the advocacy, by different board 
members, of differing approaches to the decision-making tasks. The expression of cognitive 
conflict during discussions is considered to be a critical component of decision-making 
groups: “debate is critical in liberating relevant information and shaping effective courses of 
action” (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997:43). Since the complexity of board’s tasks overwhelms the 
knowledge of one person, board members are supposed to share their own, unique experiences 
or perspectives via discussions or other forms of interaction (Schweiger et.al., 1989). In 
particular, board members must find ways to let their views aired, to challenge one another’s 
viewpoint without breaking the code of congeniality. Debate facilitates the generation of ideas 
and provides the opportunity to critically assess multiple alternatives and to question false 
assumptions (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997). Debate has some overlap - but is not identical to - the 
concepts of task conflict, which can also be found in studies on top management teams and 
cognitive conflict, which is also proposed in Forbes and Millikens’ board model. Task or 
cognitive conflict exists when there are disagreements among group members about task 
issues, including differences in ideas and opinion on how best to perform the content of the 
task (Jehn, 1995). The difference with debate boils down to the fact that the concept of task 
conflict is essentially based on a perception of difference or disagreement which does not 
necessarily need to be expressed verbally (Simons et. al., 1999). Next to the recognition in 
literature of including debate as an intervening process variable, when studying decision-
making groups, the issue has also been emphasised by the directors themselves. A recent 
study by Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) revealed that directors perceive the occurrence of 
objective debate as one of the key criteria for board effectiveness. Their findings are 
consistent with the evidence of a qualitative study by Finkelstein and Mooney (2003). They 
noted that during their interviews, all directors mentioned the importance of constructive 
conflict in discussing diverse views among themselves and with the CEO. Debate, as a 
construct, can be measured by extending the scale from Simons et. al. (1999).  
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In particular, board members can be ask to rate statements such as “discussions during 
the meetings are constructive”, “when discussing an issue directors state clear disagreement 
with each other”, “different directors propose different approaches to the issue”, “directors 
openly challenge each other’s opinion” and “discussions of the issue become heated”. 
 
The effects of board characteristics on board processes 
Board size refers to the number of board members. It simply represents a board’s 
structural and compositional context. Hambrick & D’aveni (1992) state: “at a basic level, the 
resources available on a team result from how many people are on it” (p.1449). Board size is a 
well-researched characteristic as it is considered to have an important impact on the 
functioning of a board. Still, the effects produced by board size are not unambiguous as they 
can be both positive and negative. In many studies, board size is recognized as a proxy for 
directors’ expertise, and in this respect, board size is synonymous with cognitive capability 
(Amason and Sapienza, 1997). Larger boards have the potential to provide an increased pool 
of expertise because their members likely have a broader variety of backgrounds and may 
represent more specialized knowledge and skills (Smith et.al., 1994). For this reason, larger 
boards are better equipped (compared to small boards) to process large amount of information 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). The possibility for boards to draw on a larger pool of 
expertise likely contributes to the quality of the discussions in board meetings.  
Jensen (1993) however contends that board size is not unlimited. There exists a 
turning point where the benefits of an enlarged board will be outweighed by the costs in terms 
of productivity losses. As size increases, boards may be confronted with some traditional 
group dynamic problems associated with large groups. In fact, larger boards of directors 
become more difficult to co-ordinate and may experience problems with communication and 
organization, a proposition borrowed from organizational behaviourists (see for instance 
Hackman, 1990; Eisenberg et.al., 1998). By consequence, too large boards may be inhibited to 
have a fruitful debate. Besides, having a high number of board members around the table may 
hamper the board’s ability to identify, extract and use its members’ potential contribution. 
Given the limited time available during board meetings, there might be too many members to 
hear from and to persuade (Patton and Baker, 1987).  
Finally, larger boards - as any large group - may find it difficult to establish the 
interpersonal relationships which further cohesiveness (Shaw, 1976).  
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The problem of developing intense personal contact in larger boards will also 
strengthened by the episodic interactions among the board members. By consequence, they 
are prone to develop factions and coalitions which can increase group conflict and hence 
inhibit cooperation among the directors (Goodstein et. al., 1994). Thus, we offer the following 
propositions : 
 
Proposition 1 a : the effect of board size on debate will be positive but when the   size 
becomes too high, the impact on debate will be negative 
 
Proposition 1 b : the larger the size of the board, the less cohesiveness the board 
members will experience 
  
Board independence refers to the degree of independent outside representation on the 
board of directors (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). An increase in the number of 
independent directors relative to executive directors is one of the commonly prescribed 
remedies to improve corporate governance (Walsh and Seward, 1990). The ratio of outside 
independent directors is frequently used as a measure of the extent to which a board is able to 
act independently, especially from management. Particularly, the agency perspective 
presumes that independent directors - irrespective of the way they are defined3 -, engage in a 
critical assessment of management proposals and that they take a dispassionate stand vis-à-vis 
management interests and values (Kosnik, 1987). Because of their non-employment status 
independent directors are supposed to identify with the interests of the shareholders as well as 
to operate in the best interest of the company in an unbiased and object way (Van den Berghe 
and Baelden, 2005). In other words, due to the absence of close ties to the company, 
independent directors are able and better placed to approach issues at a distance and to speak 
up more freely. In addition, the literature on director interlocks suggests that independent 
directors bring along important information about business practices and policies, due to their 
experiences on other boards. This information may further enable problem-solving and 
facilitates discussions (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Rindova, 1999).  
                                                 
 
3
 In countries where the Anglo-American system prevails and thus where the manager de facto calls the shots, 
independence is defined with respect to the management.  In contrast, in many Continental European countries 




In contrast, the contribution of executives sitting on the board is believed to be less 
straightforward. Although executive directors may bring along firm-specific information, 
which is presumed to lead to a more effective decision-making process (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), their willingness to be actively involved in candid 
discussions has been questioned. It is argued that executive directors’ objectivity will be 
impaired by their dual role as full-time manager (Kosnik, 1987). Especially their ties and 
loyalty to the CEO, in addition to the fear of retaliation which could harm future working 
relationships or career perspectives, may prevent executive directors to openly voice 
disagreement during board discussions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Patton and Baker, 
1987).   
At the same time, increasing board independence, by attracting more independent 
directors may hamper the integration of board members. By definition, independent directors 
are not employees of the company and do not assume management tasks. As most boards of 
directors meet only a few times a year, outside independent directors interact less frequently 
with each other and with the executives. Moreover, they are less close-knit because they have 
affiliations with different firms. Thus, we offer the following propositions :  
  
Proposition 2 a : an increase in board independence will increase debate 
 
Proposition 2 b : an increase in board independence is negatively related to 
cohesiveness 
  
Board diversity refers to the degree to which a board is heterogeneous with respect to 
informational demographic attributes (Jehn et.al., 1997). In particular, board diversity reflects 
differences in knowledge, experience and skills (due to educational, functional or 
occupational backgrounds, industry experience etc.). In the case of boards of directors, the 
issue of diversity is introduced by the resource dependence perspective. By recruiting outside 
directors with different backgrounds or who represent specific organizations, boards of 
directors help to link the company to its external environment and as such secure critical 
resources (Pfeffer, 1972). In addition, the interest in board diversity is growing, by no means 
under the pressure of major institutional investors (see for example, TIAA-CREF’s policy 
statement dating from 1997) and other shareholder activists. Directors themselves also 
stressed the importance of having a diversified mix of people on the board of directors in 
order to be effective (Levrau and Van den Berghe 2007).  
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However, up to date the concept of diversity is a rather unexplored domain in 
empirical board research (Carter et. al., 2002). In contrast, research on diversity in other 
settings has a long-standing history. Although the issue of diversity has not been approached 
in a uniform way, two streams have been identified that influence the way diversity is 
conceptionalized. One stream of research approaches diversity from a moral-ethical 
perspective and focuses on the social inequity in order to identify discriminatory practices in 
the workplace. A second research stream studies diversity from an organizational and 
economical perspective in order to examine the effects of diversity on work-related outcomes 
(Janssens and Steyaert, 2003). Especially the latter points out robust relationships which can 
to some extent be extrapolated to the context of boards of directors. 
Diversity among board members is assumed to improve debate due to the obvious 
reason that diversity is commonly associated with different life experiences and hence diverse 
perspectives (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997). In fact, research on group heterogeneity suggests that 
creativity is positively related to skill-based heterogeneity because diverse perspectives can 
produce and consider a broad array of solutions and decision criteria (Schweiger et.al., 1986). 
This is of particular relevance when groups are confronted with complex, non-routine tasks, as 
it is the case with boards of directors. From a different point of view, research has also shown 
that board members who are in a minority position have the potential to provide unique 
perspectives and challenge the conventional wisdom among the majority in the board 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). For example, when the majority of board members represents a 
particular functional background (e.g. finance), the opinion expressed by a board member 
with a different background (e.g. marketing) may shed another light on the topic, and hence, 
change the discussions. 
Although the results of empirical research on the cognitive capacity of groups are 
consistently positive (see the reviews by Milliken and Martins, 1996 and Williams and 
O’Reilly, 1998), if boards become too diverse, debate may be hampered by difficulties in 
understanding of alternatives, attributable to differences in language or background (Pelled, 
1996). Board members with the same background share a language which reflects similarities 
in interpreting, understanding and responding to information. Directors who are not familiar 
with this shared language may find it difficult to communicate (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). 
In addition, heterogeneous boards have a greater potential for disputes (Goodstein et.al., 
1994), are less able to agree on means and objectives (Golden and Zajac, 2001) and by 
consequences, it may be difficult to research consensus.  
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At the same time, based on socio-psychological research, greater heterogeneity on 
boards likely has a negative impact on cohesiveness. An explanation can be found in the 
social categorization and similarity/attraction theory. The first refers to the process of self-
categorization. The basic assumption of the social categorization theory is that individuals 
seek a positive self-identity. Therefore, on the base of demographic attributes, individuals 
classify themselves and others into social categories. This process permits the individual to 
define himself in terms of a social identity and to compare himself to others (Tajfel, 1982). 
Individuals are perceived as in-group members if they have similar features and out-group 
members otherwise. There is a tendency then to evaluate the members of other categories 
more negatively which results in stereotyping, polarization and anxiety (Tsui et. al., 1992). 
According to this theory, individuals tend to prefer homogeneous groups of similar persons. 
Diversity, in contrast will trigger the process of social categorization. The more diverse a 
board is composed, the greater the chance directors will be confronted with individuals of 
other social categories, resulting in increased hostility which may have detrimental effects on 
the cohesiveness within the board. A similar prediction is grounded in the similarity/attraction 
paradigm. According to this perspective, individuals who perceive themselves similar to 
others tend to empathize with and feel attracted to these other persons (Byrne, 1971). 
Similarity can appear on all kinds of attributes ranging from demographic variables to 
attitudes and values. Being similar reinforces a person’s attitude and beliefs while 
dissimilarity is considered negatively (Tsui and O’Reilly, 1989). Empirical research on groups 
already supports these predictions. In particular, diversity on attributes like gender, race and 
functional background have been found to negatively influence affective outcomes such as 
commitment, cohesiveness (or social integration), satisfaction etc. at both the individual and 
group level (see Milliken and Martins, 1996 and Williams and O’Reilly, 1998 for a review). 
Applied to a board context, diversity, irrespective of the way it is uttered/expressed, yields 
dissimilarity among the members which lowers interpersonal attraction and liking. Thus, we 
advance the following propositions :  
  
Proposition 3 a : the effect of board diversity on debate will be positive but when 
the board becomes too diverse, the impact on debate will be negative 
 
Proposition 3b : the greater the diversity in the board of directors, the less 
cohesiveness the board members will  experience 
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The moderating role of conflict norms 
In addition, we expect that the strength of the relationship between board 
characteristics and debate, may depend on current norms regarding conflict. Norms are a set 
of informal, unwritten rules derived from shared beliefs which regulate board members’ 
behaviour (Shaw, 1976; Wageman, 1995; Nadler, 2004). Although individuals behave 
differently, they care about how they are perceived by other group members and strive to 
comport themselves in accordance with group norms (Bainbridge, 2002). Bettenhausen and 
Murnighan (1985) consider norms as “standards against which the person can evaluate the 
appropriateness of behaviour,… providing order and meaning to what otherwise might be 
seen as an ambiguous, uncertain, or perhaps threatening situation” (p.350). In particular, 
conflict norms refer to standards that “encourage an openness and acceptance of 
disagreement” (Jehn, 1995). Conflict norms are suggested as a necessary condition for the 
emergence of debate (Faulk, 1982). Without these norms, the board of directors is unable to 
take advantage of its diversity and available expertise. Only if there is an atmosphere in which 
board members can freely express their opinions, open discussion will emerge. It is likely that 
directors will hesitate to be a ‘devil’s advocate’ if board norms do not allow critical questions 
being asked. Conversely, when a board of directors is characterized by a willingness to 
challenge and the utterance of viewpoints is expected, board members may feel encouraged to 
become actively involved in board discussions. This view is reinforced by the findings of a 
recent study by Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007). They revealed that many directors 
emphasized the importance of an open board culture where it is considered appropriate to 
engage in a vigorous debate. In addition, Amason and Sapienza (1997), found in their study 
on top management teams a positive impact of ‘openness’ on task conflict. Also Huse (2005) 
includes board culture in his research framework and has found in a recent study of 
Norwegian firms that ‘openness and generosity’ (one of the measures of board culture) was 
positively related to specific board roles. In essence, while board size, independence and 
diversity provide the potential for debate, conflict norms represent the catalyst that unlocks 
this potential. Relying on Jehn’s (1995) example, researcher could operationalize conflict 
norms by asking board members to rate statements such as “differences of opinions are 
accepted in the board”, “disagreement is detrimental to getting the work done by the board”, 
“critical questions are tolerated in the board”, “disagreement is dealt with openly in the board” 
and “directors try to avoid disagreement at all costs”. Based on the above mentioned 
argumentation, we offer the fourth proposition :  
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Proposition 4 : the greater the conflict norms, the stronger the relationships  
between board size, independence, diversity and debate 
 
Indirect effects of board characteristics: the board processes-task performance link 
The strategic as well as the control role of the board include complex and interactive 
tasks which require a minimum level of interpersonal attraction, or cohesiveness, among the 
board members in order to perform these tasks effectively. In particular, the performance of 
these tasks depends on mutual trust and professional respect and this is more difficult to 
sustain when boards are more fragmented (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Genuine collegiality 
in the boardroom is required which breathes confidence that board members are respectful 
listening to each other point of view and are committed to working through the board tasks in 
a collective way. Empirical research on other groups has already found a positive relationship 
between cohesiveness and performance outcomes (Cohen and Baily, 1997). Higher cohesive 
or integrated groups experience higher levels of member satisfaction (Bettenhausen, 1991), a 
higher productivity (Shaw, 1976) and a lower turnover rate (O’Reilly et.al., 1989).  
Still, it can be argued that the impact of cohesiveness on board task performance is not 
simply linear. In fact, group studies have demonstrated that a high level of cohesiveness may 
lead to a pressure to conform with group standards and a striving for unanimity at the expense 
of critical thinking and questioning of assumptions, a phenomenon known as ‘groupthink’ 
(Janis, 1983). Also boards of directors may be vulnerable to the danger of groupthink to the 
extent politeness and courtesy is emphasized over critical oversight and quality strategic 
decision-making (Jensen, 1993). In this respect, board members are failing to examine 
alternatives, to be either self-critical or critical to others, and being selective in gathering 
information (Bainbridge, 2002). Based on these assumptions, we advance the following 
propositions: 
  
Proposition 5 : the effect of cohesiveness on board task performance will be positive 
but when cohesiveness is too high, the impact on board task performance may be 
negative 
 
As noted before, in most boards, directors are faced with complex strategic and 
monitoring issues.  
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By relying on their specific expertise and backgrounds they may have different 
viewpoints on how to accomplish these issues and especially on what trade-offs need to be 
made. In view of reaching a consensus, board members are deemed to challenge and critically 
oppose each other’s ideas. Research by Schweiger et.al (1986) suggests that the presence of 
debate improves group performance by formalizing and legitimizing conflict and by 
encouraging critical evaluation. According to Eisenhardt et.al. (1997) debate “provides a more 
inclusive range of information, a deeper understanding of the issues, and a richer set of 
possible solutions” (p.43). Simons et.al. (1999) argued that when team members are 
confronted with other opinions they are forced to reconsider their viewpoints with information 
they have not thought of before. Furthermore, team members might see the benefit of 
evaluating alternatives and of taking a broader approach to decision-making. Hayashi (2004), 
for instance, found that teams who’s members share and exchange knowledge tend to perform 
better. Also results of empirical research regarding the effect of task conflict on performance 
outcomes have proven that this type of conflict is generally beneficial. Task conflict is 
productive in groups performing non-routine tasks (Jehn 1995) and it enhances the quality of 
decisions (Amason 1996, Pelled et.al., 1999). Based on this evidence, we advance the 
following proposition: 
  
Proposition 6 :  debate will be positively related to board task performance  
 
Limitations and boundary conditions of the model 
The model we have developed is characteristized by several limitations and boundary 
conditions. Caution is also required in empirical testing. First, the model that we propose is 
primarily developed for one-tier or unitary boards. Although the unitary board of directors is 
internationally the most prevalent, it must be noted that some European countries have a two-
tier board structure, for example Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. As both systems 
are grounded in varying legal and historical contexts, it is clear that a unitary and a two-tier 
board differ substantially in their composition, operations and responsibilities. In one-tier 
boards, executive as well as non-executive directors convene to form one board. In such a 
system, executives perform a double function: as board members they are involved in board 
matters while as executives they are responsible for the operations and the daily execution of 
board decisions. In a two-tier system, the supervisory board is formed of non-executive 
directors only and in some cases also includes employees.  
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Its main duties lie in supervision, control and (strategic) advice. The second tier is 
formed by the board of management and is responsible for execution of the strategic 
decisions. It is defensible to take these differences into account in exploring board processes 
and consequently in determining the effectiveness of boards. 
Second, the proposed relationships within our framework are not exclusive. In spite of 
the fact that the identified intervening variables are separate constructs, we acknowledge the 
possibility that they can influence each other. For example, when board members air their 
ideas in open discussions, the danger of groupthink diminishes. Conversely, boards that are 
more fragmented, may be hampered in conveying debate while directors feel less motivated to 
make an effort to contribute. In addition, it can be stated that not all of the relationships may 
be one-directional and for instance, board outcomes reciprocally impact board structure. 
When the strategic or monitoring tasks are not carried out in a sufficient manner, the board 
will likely decide to change the composition of the board. Still, it is more difficult to predict 
the exact nature and strength of these relationships among the variables. 
Third, we have integrated only a limited number of process variables into the model of which 
we believe are the most relevant for studying board effectiveness. More specificially, we have 
distinguished three intervening variables, namely cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms. However, 
there exists a variety of other process variables that have been identified in (group) literature but that 
are not included in our board model. Examples are internal task process (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992), 
use of knowledge and skills (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), decision-making attention (Golden and 
Zajac, 2001) and decision comprehensiveness (Simons et.al., 1999). Nevertheless, they also offer 
interesting avenues for further research, particularly from the angle of the decision-making process. It 
might be worthwhile to explore to what extent these variables contribute to our model of board 
effectiveness next to the ones that we have selected.  
Fourth, it must be noted that the static nature of input-process-output models of group 
effectiveness has raised critical questions and there is a plea to pay more attention to the 
dynamic nature of group systems (Ruigrok and Tacheva, 2004). Demb and Neubauer (1992) 
already touched upon this issue by introducing the ‘reinforcing loop’ in order to 
conceptionalize the findings of their directors’ poll. Although we value their approach, 
mapping board models that way, it is not evident to detect the determining variable that 
reinforces either positive or negative cycles of board behaviour. Perhaps longitudinal research 
methods may shed more light on this interdependence nature of dynamic board systems. 
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Fifth, in our model board effectiveness has been defined as a dual role set, supported 
by the underlying theories However, as the theoretical foundations provide at the same time 
complementary and conflicting propositions on the role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors a question arises as to their varying usefulness. Lynall et.al. (2003), for example, 
stated that “it is not a matter of choosing one theoretical perspective over another but, rather, 
of identifying under which conditions each is more applicable” (419). A first attempt to 
identify the conditions which determine the extent the board prefers one role to another is 
covered by Zald (1969). In his paper he points out four factors (i) structure of external groups 
(e.g. concentrated ownership), (ii) dependence of the company on its directors, especially the 
need for financial support, (iii) the directors’ knowledge of the company’s operations and (iv) 
the general health and conditions of the company (e.g. crises and transitions). Building on the 
work of Zald, Zahra and Pearce (1989) identify additional internal and external contingencies 
such as company size and life cycle, type of business, CEO style, industry type etc. 
Finally, some researchers strongly plea to incorporate such a contingency perspective 
in board research in a more substantial way (Heracleous, 2000; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b). 
In fact, these researchers advocate the idea that a company should tailor its governance 
structures and processes to its environment. Previous research on high-tech, venture-backed 
companies for instance, has already revealed how governance structures and processes differ 
from more traditional companies (Van den Berghe and Levrau 2002). By consequence, it can 
be stated that specific board attributes that are beneficial for one company may turn out to be 
detrimental to another. The contingency perspective might be of particular relevance when 
testing our model for board effectiveness on different types of firms.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have pointed out that research on boards of directors traditionally 
focus on a direct link between board characteristics and performance outcomes, while 
ignoring potential intervening variables. Recently, a handful of scholars have tried to fill this 
void by proposing process-oriented board models as an indirect route. We rely on this stream 
of research by presenting a new theoretical research framework for evaluating the 
effectiveness of boards. In fact, our model develops a rationale to explain how specific board 
processes may influence board outcomes which in turn may affect corporate performance. In 
developing our model we have integrated the corporate governance literature with literature 
on group effectiveness.  
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While there is an extensive amount of research on boards and a large body of work on 
group effectiveness, very little integrative studies can be found. Supported by qualitative 
findings of recent empirical field studies on boards of directors, we extract the significant 
variables from literature and integrate them into a theoretical model of board effectiveness. 
Relying on the input-process-output approach, we have explored variables that we believe are 
critical in determining the effectiveness of boards. We go beyond the structural characteristics 
of boards of directors to also include behavioural or attitudinal measures of board 
effectiveness. We have argued that cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms may be 
intervening variables which mediate the relationships between board input and board 
outcomes. In doing this, we have tried to clarify the inconsistent results found in empirical 
research on boards. Furthermore, specific relationships have been proposed. Empirical 
research is required to confirm the model and to validate the proposed relationships. We 
believe this kind of research may help to explain the differences between successful boards 
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Table 1: characteristics differentiating boards as teams 
 Boards as teams 
 
Typical teams 
Affiliation Outside directors may be 
members of more than one board; 
this is not their “day job.” 
 
Members work for the same 
organization. 
Interaction Directors spend little time 
together, making it difficult for 
them to build working 
relationships. 
Members spend considerable 
time together, experience intense 
personal interaction. 
Time and information Limited time and information 
available to mastering issues of a 
complex company. 
 
Constantly immersed in 
company’s business. 
Leaders as members Majority of members may be 
CEOs, who are used to leading, 
not following. 
 
Most members are not 
accustomed to sitting at the head 
of the table. 
Authority relationships Lines of authority complex and 
unclear; chairmen/CEOs both 
lead and report to boards. 
 
Members’ roles on the team often 
reflect their status in the 
company. 
Changing expectations Difficult to achieve consensus in 
a climate of unprecedented 
scrutiny and pressure. 
 
Usually created with a reasonably 
clear charter –such as completing 
a project- in mind. 
Formality Physical setting and social rituals 
reinforce aura of power and 
privilege. 
 
High degree of formality is rare, 
generally reflects the culture of 
the company. 
Team size Average number of members is 
rather high 
 
Average number of member is 
rather low 



















Table 2: a board of directors’ role set 
 Control role Service role Strategic role 
Board Responsibilities • Maximizing 
shareholder’s wealth 
• Primarily the board 
has to monitor actions 
of agents (executives) 
to ensure their 
efficiency and to 
protect principals’ 
(owners) interests 
• Boards are a 
cooptative 
mechanism to extract 
resources vital to 
company 
performance 
• Boards serve a 
boundary spanning 
role 
• Boards enhance 
organizational 
legitimacy 
• Boards serves as 




• Boards are rubber 
stamps (‘passive’ 
school of thought) 
• Boards are an 
important strategic 
device contributing to 
the overall 
stewardship of the 
company (‘active’ 
school of thought) 
Board Tasks • Selecting, rewarding 






focusing the attention 
of key executives on 
company performance 
• Reducing agency 
costs 




• Scanning the 
environment 
• Representing the 
firm in the 
community 
• Securing valuable 
resources  
• Providing advice to 
the organization and 
CEO 










‘Active’ view : 
• Guiding management 
to achieve corporate 
mission and 
objectives 
• Involvement in the 
strategic decision 









A broad range of 
theories e.g. managerial 
hegemony theory and  
stewardship theory 
 
Theoretical origins Law 







(Source: adapted from Zahra and Pearce. 1989) 
 
